1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
3	
4	DAVID ARNOLD,
5	Plaintiff,
6	v.) Civil Action No.) 1:21-cv-10731-IT
7	MICHAEL PEARLMAN,)
8	Defendant.)
9	,
10	
11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE INDIRA TALWANI, DISTRICT JUDGE
12	MOTION HEARING BY VIDEOCONFERENCE
13	
14	Tuesday, December 14, 2021
15	2:29 p.m.
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	John J. Moakley United States Courthouse
21	Courtroom No. 9 One Courthouse Way
22	Boston, Massachusetts
23	Robert W. Paschal, RMR, CRR
24 Official Court Reporter	
25	1 · -1 · - 2 - 0 9 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

1	APPEARANCES
2	On behalf of the Plaintiff:
3	
4	DAVID ARNOLD PRO SE
5	94 Pierce Road Watertown, MA 02472
6	(617) 335-4113 david-arnold@earthlink.net
7	
8	On behalf of the Defendant:
9	UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
10	BY: RAYFORD A . FARQUHAR One Courthouse Way
11	Suite 9200 Boston, MA 02210
12	(617) 748-3100 rayford.farquhar@usdoj.gov
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

PROCEEDINGS

(In open court at 2:29 p.m.)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: United States District Court is now in session, the Honorable Judge Indira Talwani presiding.

This is Case Number 21-cy-10731, Arnold versus the

This is Case Number 21-cv-10731, Arnold versus the United States of America, et al. Will the parties please identify themselves for the record, beginning with the plaintiff.

MR. ARNOLD: Hello, Judge. My name is David
Arnold. I'm the person who did this work and didn't get
paid, so --

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. ARNOLD: Good afternoon.

MR. FARQUHAR: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Ray Farquhar for the United States.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. FARQUHAR: Good afternoon.

THE COURT: So we are here on two motions by the United States: a motion to substitute party and motion to dismiss, which are related. I will allow -- I'll have the Government counsel start, since it's your motion. And then I tend to go back and forth on my questioning, but I'll let you start, Mr. Farquhar.

MR. FARQUHAR: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, my associate, Jason Weida, filed the

Government's motions before the Court -- as the Court stated, a motion to substitute and also a motion to dismiss.

The motion to substitute was based on the declaration of Dr. Pearlman's immediate supervisor,

Mr. Charles Alcock, who described the work that Dr. Pearlman undertook during the course of the allegations of this complaint being within the scope of his employment for the Government.

Based upon the information that was provided to the Government, the United States attorney for the District of Massachusetts, through designation of the attorney general, moved to substitute the United States for Dr. Pearlman. Once that substitution was made, the case, of course, was removed here to federal court, and the United States then moved to dismiss based upon the motion that's before Your Honor.

Your Honor, I think the Government's submissions were fairly clear in the position that it took. I would like to also just argue one other aspect of the motion. It's really derivative of what -- derivative to what is before the Court, and that's the statute of limitations as well.

One of the issues that the Government's motion to dismiss also brings into play is the fact that the Government has stated that the plaintiff failed to meet the two-year presentment statute of limitations under the FDCA before the Government --

1 2

THE COURT: But aren't those related? I mean, if I agree with your positions as to the substitution being proper and this being within the scope of employment, then the case is dismissed. If I disagree, then is this the correct statute of limitations to be using? I mean, don't I sort of not get there one way -- either I rule for or against you on the threshold issues.

MR. FARQUHAR: No, Your Honor; and, actually, that's the discussion I would like to bring before the Court on this point.

If you look at what's docket number -- and Your Honor doesn't have to look at it, but I'll describe to you what I'm referring to -- Docket Number 13, which is a copy of the plaintiff's state court complaint, page 7 of 64. I am only referring Your Honor to the cover page of the complaint; but at that page, it was -- the complete was filed in the County of Middlesex on March 8, 2021, and is a complaint against Michael Pearlman as the defendant.

If you look at paragraph 13 of that March 8, 2021, complaint, plaintiff states: "When the contract was due for renewal in November of 2017, Mr. Arnold told Dr. Pearlman that the workload was beyond available funding. His response was, 'As far as funding goes, I had to fight hard to get what we got, see Exhibit G.'

"This came as a surprise to Mr. Arnold, who

25

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

expected to be paid retroactively once funding could be 1 arranged for the extra work on the new design. 2 The design had to be completed quickly. The only option was to continue working without proper pay and deal with the funding problems later." And it ends with, "See Exhibit H." And, again, that was paragraph 13 of the complaint, which was dated March 8, 2021. 7 THE COURT: Okay. I'm just -- I'm sorry -- I'm --MR. FARQUHAR: Sure. So --9 THE COURT: I'm looking at -- hold on. I just want 10 11 to be where you are. I'm on -- the copy of the complaint I have was docked at 1-1. 12 13 MR. FARQUHAR: Yeah. I'm referring to -- if you go 14 to Docket Number 13, it's the same complaint; the only difference is that, at Docket 13, that complaint actually has 15 the state court date stamp as to when it was filed. 16 THE COURT: Okay. So I'll take your word for it on 17 the state -- on the date of it, but now I'm just looking at 18 19 paragraph 13. 20 MR. FARQUHAR: Yes. THE COURT: And 13 says --21 MR. FARQUHAR: I'm at the -- probably the bottom 22 23 third, where it starts off with -- on -- towards the right-hand side, "When the contract was due for renewal" --24 25 THE COURT: Got it.

MR. FARQUHAR: -- "in November 2017." 1 THE COURT: So your position would be that, even 2 3 under state law --MR. FARQUHAR: It would be --THE COURT: -- it would be untimely. 5 MR. FARQUHAR: That is correct, Your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. MR. FARQUHAR: Because the Government's position 8 would be, as of that time, plaintiff has made it clear that 9 he knew or should have known about the improper, as he 10 11 alleged, pay dispute, but determined that he would deal with the funding problems later. 12 13 THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand that 14 argument. Let me -- I'm sorry; did you have more --MR. FARQUHAR: No, Your Honor, I did not. 15 THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Arnold, let me turn to 16 17 you. 18 And I have -- I actually have sort of a substantive 19 question that I think is answered from the papers, but do I understand correctly that, within the work that you performed 20 that you did get paid for, does that -- hold on -- that that 21 work included -- for the work that you got paid, that 22 23 included work on this project for which there was other work you didn't get paid? But some of the work on this project 24 25 did get paid through it, and some didn't? Is that a fair

statement, the Lares-2?

MR. ARNOLD: None of the Lares-2 was paid for because there was no money.

THE COURT: So the Government submitted the declaration of Michael Pearlman, and attached to the declaration of Michael Pearlman, as an exhibit -- I guess it's part of Exhibit A -- was the original purchase order and the various changes and so forth.

And then it also included an invoice, a November 11th invoice, and it says, "For services, 300 hours at \$50 an hour." And then it describes, on the next page, "List of projects, work completed," and says, "The primary work has been on the design of the Lares-2 retroreflector array."

So doesn't that mean that you got paid for some of that work, not all of it, but some of it?

MR. ARNOLD: No. What happened was there was an ongoing contract, which has a lot of different duties under it, and that took up, actually, at least as much funding as there was there. So there was nothing left.

I didn't discover until a year after that that, in fact, Dr. Pearlman had no legal authority to pay me for any of the Lares-2 work. And that had to do with the -- Exhibit D by Dr. Merkowitz, which says that NASA funds cannot be used to support the work of a foreign agency unless

there's a partnership agreement between the foreign agency and NASA.

And he was not aware of any such arrangement, and Dr. Pearlman has not produced any such arrangement, although he claimed at one point that we -- I don't know who "we" was -- we agreed that, because of the importance of this project, that you could charge money to the contract. But, again, there's nothing to substantiate the fact that there is any such agreement. That was also one of the exhibits.

THE COURT: Well, so it may be that he shouldn't have paid you, and it may be that you did -- for the 15- -- he shouldn't have paid you anything for Lares, and it may be that you did more than enough work on other things that weren't Lares.

MR. ARNOLD: That's correct.

THE COURT: But it is correct, though, that you essentially sent in a bill for an invoice for \$15,000 that included in it work you did on Lares?

MR. ARNOLD: Well, he asked me to put that in, and not knowing any better, I did.

THE COURT: Yeah, no, I understand that now, that sort of legally it sort of doesn't make that much sense, but it -- if -- to you.

But if I understand what happened here, there was a project. You were asked to do some work on the project.

There's the e-mail that you quote as the misrepresentation that says, at least initially, the work can be challenged. And you're saying now he shouldn't have said that because he shouldn't have had -- he didn't have any authority to do that. But that's what he did. He said, at least initially, the work can be charged. And, in fact, it was; and it was, in fact, paid for.

So to then say, well, but he was breaking the rules, and, therefore, it isn't covered, therefore you can survive the motion to dismiss, I think -- I think the problem is that's not how the analysis works. It isn't --

You know, I mean, let's say you have a postman driving a postal truck, and while he's delivering in the postal truck, he drives badly. And he starts speeding. You can say, well, that's outside of the scope. He's told he shouldn't ever go faster than 25 in a residential neighborhood, but he's going 45. So you could -- sort of common sense to say he was acting beyond the way he's supposed to have acted.

But from the point of view here, it isn't did you do your job wrong? It's were you doing this in the course of what you thought was -- you were doing within your job? I think that's the difficulty here. This is the -- the analogy is that the postman drives too fast and runs over a kid.

MR. ARNOLD: Well, first of all, this was basically

a proposal, this work. There was no funding to do this, and we all knew that. But the situation was such that the work either had to be done now or not at all. In other words, if I had stopped working after the \$15,000, there would have been no project.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ARNOLD: And I had to decide, well, which is more important? Whether I get paid for a year's work or whether we ruin a \$50 million project?

Now, I realize that's not a legal argument, but it certainly is something that I had to consider from an ethical point of view.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. ARNOLD: And, also, the contract should have been written as a proposal. In other words, I knew that this design would work, and I was willing to go ahead and do it, even though I knew I wasn't getting paid, because I knew in the end that the Government would see that it worked and they would pay me for my -- basically, a proposal.

The problem is that the legal documents are not written as a proposal. If it had been done under the SAO contract, SAO would have owned the commercial rights to it. But the work was done outside the SAO contract, so that was no protection, and I didn't have a separate contract.

What we probably should have done was set this up

as a proposal which is proprietary with the proper documents, statements in there, NDAs, whatever, so that I would have some leverage to get paid. But, in fact, I ended up working under something where there was no protection of my intellectual property rights and not enough money to pay me.

And I discovered a year later that, in fact, it would have been -- there was no way that he ever could have gotten the money because there was no agreement with the agency, and that's required to use NASA funds.

Another aspect of it was that the way I was getting paid, although stated as an hourly wage, in fact, right from the beginning in 2003, it was more like a retainer where I was just being paid a thousand dollars a month. And that's the way I always billed it for the 15 years. I never itemized my hours. So what I was doing was just billing what was supposed to be sort of an average rate of pay for me under normal circumstances and had been for 15 years.

But this year was an exception. I was asked to do work that was basically full-time under a contract arrangement. He was paying me an average of, you know, a thousand dollars a month. This work ended up being ten times what I would have normally done during that year.

But, you know, not being a lawyer and having to be responsible for whether this design got done on time, I just went ahead and did the work. If we missed a launch date, the

whole project would have gone down the tubes. So what was I supposed to do? I mean, morally, I couldn't not do the work even though I knew I wasn't getting paid. Do you see what I mean?

THE COURT: Well, I'm very sympathetic to the equities of the argument. I think the difficulty here is the intersect between what the law requires, which is all I can follow, which is not the same as sort of the necessarily common sense of how people might deal with this project.

And the -- the situation should not have happened as it did, right? You work -- you do work, you should be paid for the work that you do. And my guess is there's nobody who disagrees with that.

I think the difficulty is, the way the law is set up, it sort of ends up to protect the tax dollar, that even if someone goes and does these kinds of things, it ends up being a legal constraint that you can't collect for it. And that's — there's really no — there's no wiggle room here that I can say, "Well, I see it sort of differently, and let me figure out what's the fair answer."

It's sort of -- it's kind of a cut-and-dry circumstance here where your point that this isn't what he should have been doing is maybe well taken, but that isn't the test for what gets it out of whether it was within the scope of his employment or not.

MR. ARNOLD: Well, another issue here is that he assigned me to work for a foreign agency, and that was way beyond -- no authority to be asking me to do this, in the first place.

And the general counsel of the Smithsonian observatory has agreed with that. She said Mr. Arnold's work in no way, nor ever, should have included the complete design of a foreign satellite. And Dr. Pearlman in his declaration has also admitted that, once I started working on this, I was outside the scope of the contract.

But the point is, he's the one that asked me to do it, and I've got the e-mails to prove it, and he asked me to go well beyond the statement of work.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think that you have the e-mails to prove that he agreed that you should be paid for it, it -- beyond the initial payment. What his -- what you have is a contract that, I agree with you, it says that you can do this under the -- at least initially, under the funds he has.

And, again, he maybe didn't properly have authority. That maybe wasn't what he should have been doing with his contract money, but that doesn't --

MR. ARNOLD: Well, there were --

THE COURT: -- get you around the scope of employment problem.

MR. ARNOLD: There were two stages to the work. First of all, there was going to be just a simple design, which I could have done within the available funding, basically, just to modify the spacecraft to fit the new

launch vehicle.

What happened was I told people, which was my professional responsibility, that this satellite could be redesigned to achieve a goal that has been elusive for almost 20 years now, which is to get an accuracy of one millimeter on this array.

Now, how I -- the work -- the issue did arise as to just what my contractual status was. And I had objected to going on with the work because the Italian contractor was hiding some of the work I was doing from Dr. Pearlman. I said, "Well, you can't do that. You know, he has to know what's going on and has to approve it, or I can't get an approval for this work from NASA."

At that point, in order to make sure that I kept working -- because we both knew I could not stop working -- he said, "Go ahead. Do whatever you can to support this project." And my argument would be that's an implied contract. He told me to do the work, both of us knowing that it was beyond the available funding.

THE COURT: But --

MR. ARNOLD: And he also --

THE COURT: -- you understood -- you're not 1 2 suggesting that it was your understanding that he was going to pay you personally, right? MR. ARNOLD: No. I expected that he was going to be able to get funding from NASA. Now, the misrepresentation 5 comes in that, in fact, he knew that that was not possible because he knew -- although I did not -- that the money could 7 not legally be used that way. 9 And he should have -- at the time we were discussing this, the terms and conditions of my work, he 10 11 should have been honest with me and told me there's no way that we can pay you even retroactively. But he failed to do 12 13 that. So because he failed to state the correct terms and 14 conditions, you know, he was -- he was misrepresenting his 15 ability to pay me. See, he's the head of the Global Geodetic Observing 16 System, which is an organization that has nothing to do with 17 18 Smithsonian, per se. It's an international organization. 19 It's not an employer. THE COURT: He's not paid by them. He's not --20 MR. ARNOLD: That's right. 21 THE COURT: -- an employee of that organization, 22 23 correct? MR. ARNOLD: That's correct. 24 25 THE COURT: And when he appears at that

organization, he includes in his name and his title his Smithsonian title, correct?

MR. ARNOLD: That's the place where he works and he works as a manager.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ARNOLD: But the letter in which he justified accepting the design was the GGOS, the Global Geodetic Observing System. And I've got the letter right here. So in other words, when he was asking me to do this work, he was not doing it as an SAO employee; he was doing it as the head of an international organization which does not pay him.

THE COURT: Except he's head of an international organization in his same employment role. He's not outside of that position. He's still getting paid when he's doing that work, and he's probably getting travel funds on his grants and so forth.

It's not -- I understand that there's -- we -- you know, it's a difficult -- it's a difficult situation when you try to mirror what happens in the scientific community where there is real international collaboration about things with how our domestic rules about funding and contracts work, but that is -- that is what we have.

MR. ARNOLD: In principle, the Italian Space Agency should have paid me because it's their satellite and they couldn't do this design without me, and they should have paid

me.

THE COURT: Correct. That may well be correct, but that doesn't give you a claim against Dr. Pearlman.

MR. ARNOLD: Well, it does in the sense that, if I had known that, if I had known he couldn't pay me, I wouldn't have done the work. In other words, the way he got the work out of me was by pretending that he could pay me. If I had known that it was not legal for him to pay me using NASA funds, I would have said, "Hey, look, we've got to stop right here and decide how I'm going to get paid. Either you" --

THE COURT: Well, regardless of whether it was legal or not, he did pay you --

MR. ARNOLD: No.

THE COURT: -- based on invoices that you submitted that included this work.

MR. ARNOLD: I included that work, but he asked me to put it there, not because I expected -- not because that was pay for what I did. He never paid me enough to cover this work.

THE COURT: He didn't pay you enough -- no one is saying he paid you enough to cover the work. I'm saying he paid you under the contract including for some of this work. And so when you say he didn't have authority to pay you for this work, be that as it may be, he said to you, at least initially, it would be under the contract. It was -- up to

the contract price, it was under the contract.

There's no -- I have no lack of sympathy for you on how this unfolded, and I hear what you're saying about this being something that was an important matter on a scientific level. But what we're dealing with here are the domestic rules about what the Government ends up -- how their contracts work and how their employees work. And it's really -- it's a legal question, not an equitable question. So I don't -- I don't think there's a gray area here.

So I am going to grant the Government's motion. It is a purely legal question. I don't think there are any facts in dispute that are important for this decision. I mean, there are some facts in dispute, probably, but the decision is just based on this factual record as it is here, which means that you can appeal it. It is a legal question.

But I'm -- unfortunately, it's a circumstance where it really isn't a question of sort of what -- you know, you did the work; you should get paid for the work. That isn't the question, unfortunately, here. It's whether Dr. Pearlman is obligated to pay it here and whether the United States is obligated to pay it here. So --

MR. ARNOLD: Well, I'd like to point out that how this happened has cost the Government far more than what they save by not paying me because I ended up stopping working on projects which could have revolutionized all of laser

tracking and --

THE COURT: There are many -- there's no question that this -- there's nobody here -- you know, counsel for the Government isn't going to -- doesn't have the information one way or another. I don't think he's going to take a position to disagree with what you're saying. This may not have been a cost-effective move. But that isn't an answer that any of us can address here.

I mean, the only -- you know, there's a process for obtaining funds and releasing funds; and there isn't really a way to go back and say, well, really, we should have paid you more before and so forth. That's sort of -- you're stuck with what the law will allow at this point.

MR. ARNOLD: Now, another thing is that I had the opportunity to work for the other competitor on this project, and he would have paid me; but because Dr. Pearlman had already agreed to pay me, falsely, because he knew he couldn't, I turned down the other one. Now, again, the issue is his misrepresentation. If he had told me the truth, I would have worked for somebody who could pay me.

But the claim I'm making -- I'll go back to misrepresentation. The decisions that people make depend on the information available to them. And when he lies to me about his ability to pay me because he wants me to work for this contractor instead of another contractor, you know, it's

just -- to get money out of them, that's misrepresentation. He told me to do the work.

Now, he told me to work for this Italian contractor. I did all the work he asked me to do. He was under the impression that Dr. Pearlman was paying me. He didn't know until the end that he didn't and couldn't pay me.

But he did a lot of things illegally. It seems to me that that should invalidate the whole argument that he was acting within the law. He did a lot of things illegally to get me to do this work.

THE COURT: Yeah, the question is -- we don't -- I don't get to get as far as deciding whether your arguments are right or wrong about whether he was -- whether he did something wrong or didn't do something wrong. The question -- the threshold question is, whatever he was doing, was he doing it, essentially, while he was working there for the Smithsonian astrophysical observatory? Answer, yes; and in the context of that, yes. That's the problem.

And you understood it as such. You may have been misled to understand it as such, but that's what you understood it as. You weren't expecting a paycheck from him personally. You were expecting a paycheck from SAO.

MR. ARNOLD: Another issue is that, in fact, I did file a lot of complaints, and I'd like to contest the -- you know, the time limit business here, if I could just read to

you --

THE COURT: I'm not -- I'm not going to need to reach the time limit, because we don't get there on the time limit, because the -- because the claim isn't allowed to proceed if it's against him in the scope of his employment. So I'm not going to opine on the -- I'm not going to reach the time-limit question.

MR. ARNOLD: Well, but before, I would like to repeat, the general counsel said that this work was not within his scope of employment -- general counsel for the Smithsonian. Now, Dr. Alcock signed a declaration saying that it was within the scope of his employment; however, what -- his statement was incorrect.

What he said was that Dr. Pearlman asked me to assess and evaluate the Lares-2 satellite for inclusion in the International Laser Ranging Service. Now, that's what Dr. Pearlman told him, but it's not true. I never -- I was never instructed to do that task. I was instructed to work on the design, which is outside the initiative SAO.

Dr. Pearlman was not operating under his SAO.

THE COURT: So this is, again, the difficulty, which is what you're saying is he wasn't authorized to do that, he wasn't allowed to do that; therefore, he couldn't have been doing it while he was wearing his employee hat.

And I think the way the law is designed is that

these kind of claims against federal employees could happen all the time. Anybody who was unhappy with how things went, whether they're right or wrong about it, could say, "Well, this person — you know, the person who told me when to file my taxes, the person who — you know, all of these Government people and Government positions made a misrepresentation to me."

And so Congress has said no, we're not going to allow those kind of claims; and that's sort of where we are here, is that he's making the claim while he's there as the employee. It had to do with his -- your roles as employee.

He may have done something wrong. He may have. He may not have. But I don't get to get to that question because I don't get to test whether you're right about a misrepresentation because I can't -- you can't bring a misrepresentation claim when he's making his statements as a federal employee. That's the difficulty here.

So I'm -- I think we're out of time. I am -- I'll get something, hopefully, out this week. It's been sitting here a bit, and I -- it's unfortunate that it took that long, but we are here now. I will get this out.

And as I said, it's a legal question. If you think that I've got it wrong, you are -- it's not a -- it's not a fact where I'm deciding who's lying or who's telling the truth. I'm -- based on these papers, as a matter of law, I

```
think this is -- I do need to grant the Government's motion
 1
 2
     here. So I will get something out this week.
                And I thank you both, and I think we are in recess.
                MR. ARNOLD: Thank you for your time.
 4
 5
                MR. FARQUHAR: Thank you, Your Honor.
                (Court in recess at 3:01 p.m.)
 7
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

1	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER
2	
3	
4	I, Robert W. Paschal, Registered Merit Reporter and
5	Certified Realtime Reporter, in and for the United States
6	District Court for the District of Massachusetts, do hereby
7	certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States
8	Code, the foregoing pages are a true and correct transcript
9	of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the
10	above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is
11	in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial
12	Conference of the United States.
13	
14	Dated this 14th day of January, 2022.
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	/s/ Robert W. Paschal
20	ROBERT W. PASCHAL, RMR, CRR
21	Official Court Reporter
22	
23	
24	
25	